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At the end of 2013, the European Court of Human Rights delivered an impressively extensive judgement in the
case Perinçek v. Switzerland. The condemnation of a Turkish politician for the denial of Armenian genocide by
Swiss courts violated freedom of expression. Along with many human rights scholars, I would hardly shake
hands with a Holocaust or an Armenian genocide denier. Yet I will be equally sceptical of courtrooms being
appropriate sites to qualify historical truth. For a summary of that position, see my recent paper (“Historical
Revisionism: Law, Politics, and Surrogate Mourning”). At ﬁrst glance, the outcome of Perinçek is a victory for civil
rights. Limiting historical discussion by criminal prosecution is clearly an anachronism in the 21st century.
However, on a deeper reading, this decision reveals yet another judicial pitfall which substantially undermines its
outcome for freedom of speech in Europe. This pitfall stems from a sort of legal hypocrisy embedded in the
Court’s distinction between the Holocaust and other mass atrocities of the 20th century.
The Matter
During his 2005 visit to Switzerland, a Turkish politician Dr. Doğu Perinçek gave several public speeches alleging
conspiracies against Turks and an “international lie” about Armenian genocide. According to Perinçek, the scope
and nature of atrocities against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire cannot be deemed genocide. Swiss courts
found Perinçek guilty of the criminal oﬀence of genocide denial.
Together with two concurring opinions, the judgment in Strasbourg (currently available  exclusively in French)
consists of 80 pages. It oﬀers a useful ﬂashback on the Court’s engagement in multiple aspects of historical
memory.
While ﬁnding the criminal measure legitimate and partially necessary, the Court fosters a lower margin of
appreciation for Swiss authorities. The Court emphasises the particular social signiﬁcance of historical
discussion and the absence of consensus on this issue. It even doubts if such a “general consensus” is possible.
Most importantly, the Court establishes several distinctions between Holocaust deniers and Dr. Perinçek. (1) The
applicant contested only a legal qualiﬁcation of certain events, supposedly not denying historical facts. (2) In
case of Holocaust deniers, a conviction for the Nazi crimes was explicitly prescribed in the Charter of the Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg (1945). (3) The Holocaust is a fact that has been clearly established by international
jurisdiction. (4) Holocaust denial is a primary engine of the powerful Anti-Semitism movements. Meanwhile the
rejection of the genocidal character of the 1915 events cannot cause comparable consequences. (5) The Court
cites the 2006 research conducted by the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law. The study revealed that of the 16
countries analysed only 2 had a general provision on genocide denial (i.e. broader than just Holocaust denial).
(6) Furthermore, the Court extensively quotes constitutional decisions in Spain (2007) and France (2012) to
aﬃrm that the recent national jurisprudence rejects the broad criminalisation of genocide denials. (7) Finally, the
Court rules that Switzerland failed to demonstrate that a social need for this measure is stronger than in other
countries. Thus, the Swiss authorities extended the permissible limits of the margin of appreciation in violation of
Article 10 of the ECHR.
Three Fallacies
I cannot but agree with the Court on two central ﬁndings. First, drafting history is indeed an enterprise where
consensus is hardly possible. Therefore, it is worth transferring disputes about historical events from courts to
discussions amongst scholars and civil society. Second, it is hard to see how the issue of Armenian genocide
addresses a suﬃcient social need for criminal prosecution in Switzerland. The outcome of the case is a plausible
victory for the freedom of academic expression.
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However, I equally doubt if this social need for state monopoly over historic discussion is higher in other liberal
democracies. The Court creates a speculative distinction between the Holocaust and other 20th-century
atrocities. There are three fundamental fallacies in this approach, which undermine judgement and provoke the
stigmatization of Armenian communities worldwide.
1) The Court distinguishes Dr. Perinçek (who supposedly insists on an alternative qualiﬁcation of the events)
from Holocaust revisionists (who deny the substantial facts of the Shoah). It is hard to see how Perinçek could
have constructed his denial argument without re-qualifying the malicious intent of the state, the number of victims
(1-1.5 millions), the role of the Ottoman imperialism, and methods of annihilation used on the Armenian
population. Moreover, legal practice shows that discussion of history (the role of Atatürk, repressions against
Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians, etc.) remains substantially censored in Turkey. Attacks by the state and by
individuals on dissidents with alternative historical viewpoints remain common. The case of the Turkish-Armenian
journalist, Hrant Dink (who extensively commented on the Armenian genocide) is truly emblematic here.
Prosecuted for the absurd crime of denigrating Turkishness, he was assassinated in 2007. Three years later, the
ECtHR ruled that Turkey violated Dink’s right to freedom of expression.
In contrast, “Holocaust deniers” are not exclusively people who blatantly refute the existence of Jewish victims.
Holocaust revisionists include those who question the number of victims, the methods of annihilation, the role of
perpetrators, and those who suggest (despite all the abundant historical evidence) that Nazi governments did not
have intent of complete annihilation of the Jews. On a closer comparison, both issues (Auschwitzlüge and the
Armenian genocide) are a matter of qualiﬁcation.
2) The Court suggests that unlike the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust is an internationally recognised crime.
The Court forgets to mention that the Holocaust (unlike many other atrocities) ranks amongst the few endowed
with speciﬁc “legal” recognition. Judges Vučinić & Pinto De Albuquerque end their powerful dissenting opinion
by citing Raphael Lemkin, a lawyer who coined the term of genocide. It was, in fact, the Armenian tragedy that
initially inspired Lemkin’s ideas. He considered the League of Nation’s ignorance of Armenian massacre truly
shameful. The 1945 Nuremberg Statute (mentioned by the Court as clear grounds to prosecute Nazis) did not
precede the crime of the Holocaust. Likewise, Lemkin’s term “genocide” entered international vocabulary only by
virtue of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Apart from the Holocaust, neither the Roma genocide (approximately
300,000 people), nor persecution of gays, nor any other mass annihilation conducted by the Nazis received a
comparable legal acknowledgement. The Court ignores a simple fact that all genocides are a matter of contested
recognition.
3) This judgement constructs the Holocaust as a mega-genocide to which all else pales by comparison. The
Holocaust becomes a universal unit of measurement. It is unclear whether Armenian massacre stands as 0.5 or
0.8 of that unit. One can trace this meta-crime approach in the recent cases in Strasbourg. In Hoﬀer & Annen v.
Germany [2011], applicants were prosecuted for anti-abortion leaﬂets comparing the “Babycaust” to the
Holocaust. In PETA v. Germany  [2012], the animals rights association was defending its artistic campaign (“the
Holocaust on your plate”), where pictures of animals in stocks were contrasted with images of inmates in
concentration camps. In both cases, the Court (rather erroneously) found no violation of freedom of expression,
fostering an incredibly broad margin of appreciation for Germany. It remains unclear how those two instances
reﬂect a deep social need. In Perinçek, the Court even says that the denial of the Armenian genocide is
incapable of producing eﬀects similar to the danger of Anti-Semitism. With this statement the Court ignores
extreme sensitivity to this issue on the part of both the Armenian communities in Diaspora (referring to the events
as Mets Yegherrn, literally “Great Crime”) and state propaganda in Turkey and Azerbaijan (after territorial conﬂict
with Armenia). Placing Armenian genocide into the second class of “contested massacres”, the Court overlooks
the suﬀerings of hundreds of thousands of Armenian people murdered and tortured in the “death march” to the
desert in Syria, deported, raped, poisoned and burned alive during and after World War I.
In this respect, the concurring opinion of Judges Raimondi & Sajó provides an extensive disclaimer for
Armenians (explaining the diﬃcult position of the Court). Yet the only true diﬃculty is the trap into which the Court
had cornered itself in its previous Holocaust cases. While privileging the Shoah as a meta-crime, it is practically
impossible to justify the diﬀerence with comparable atrocities. Meanwhile, the Holocaust distinction gives the
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Turkish government a green light for fostering xenophobic, Turkic-centric identity. It hardly makes reconciliation
of Armenians with Turks any easier. It diminishes and degrades historical accounts of Western Armenians
indispensable for the history of the Middle East and the Caucasus. Finally, it gives further impetus for the hysteria
about a Jewish conspiracy by Anti-Semites of all kinds.
The decision to move the qualiﬁcation of Armenian genocide away from state monopoly and leave it to historians
and civil society should be wholeheartedly welcome. However, the Court’s continuous misleading approach
(distinguishing the Holocaust from other fairly comparable atrocities) substantially undermines the judgement in
Perinçek. It essentially trivialises the suﬀerings of a million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and projects a
ﬂimsy judicial iconography with the Holocaust rising over other “second-class” evils.At the end of 2013, the
European Court of Human Rights delivered an impressively extensive judgement in the case Perinçek v.
Switzerland. The condemnation of a Turkish politician for the denial of Armenian genocide by Swiss courts
violated freedom of expression. Along with many human rights scholars, I would hardly shake hands with a
Holocaust or an Armenian genocide denier. Yet I will be equally sceptical of courtrooms being appropriate sites
to qualify historical truth. For a summary of that position, see my recent paper (“Historical Revisionism: Law,
Politics, and Surrogate Mourning”). At ﬁrst glance, the outcome of Perinçek is a victory for civil rights. Limiting
historical discussion by criminal prosecution is clearly an anachronism in the 21st century. However, on a deeper
reading, this decision reveals yet another judicial pitfall which substantially undermines its outcome for freedom
of speech in Europe. This pitfall stems from a sort of legal hypocrisy embedded in the Court’s distinction
between the Holocaust and other mass atrocities of the 20th century.
The Matter
During his 2005 visit to Switzerland, a Turkish politician Dr. Doğu Perinçek gave several public speeches alleging
conspiracies against Turks and an “international lie” about Armenian genocide. According to Perinçek, the scope
and nature of atrocities against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire cannot be deemed genocide. Swiss courts
found Perinçek guilty of the criminal oﬀence of genocide denial.
Together with two concurring opinions, the judgment in Strasbourg (currently available  exclusively in French)
consists of 80 pages. It oﬀers a useful ﬂashback on the Court’s engagement in multiple aspects of historical
memory.
While ﬁnding the criminal measure legitimate and partially necessary, the Court fosters a lower margin of
appreciation for Swiss authorities. The Court emphasises the particular social signiﬁcance of historical
discussion and the absence of consensus on this issue. It even doubts if such a “general consensus” is possible.
Most importantly, the Court establishes several distinctions between Holocaust deniers and Dr. Perinçek. (1) The
applicant contested only a legal qualiﬁcation of certain events, supposedly not denying historical facts. (2) In
case of Holocaust deniers, a conviction for the Nazi crimes was explicitly prescribed in the Charter of the Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg (1945). (3) The Holocaust is a fact that has been clearly established by international
jurisdiction. (4) Holocaust denial is a primary engine of the powerful Anti-Semitism movements. Meanwhile the
rejection of the genocidal character of the 1915 events cannot cause comparable consequences. (5) The Court
cites the 2006 research conducted by the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law. The study revealed that of the 16
countries analysed only 2 had a general provision on genocide denial (i.e. broader than just Holocaust denial).
(6) Furthermore, the Court extensively quotes constitutional decisions in Spain (2007) and France (2012) to
aﬃrm that the recent national jurisprudence rejects the broad criminalisation of genocide denials. (7) Finally, the
Court rules that Switzerland failed to demonstrate that a social need for this measure is stronger than in other
countries. Thus, the Swiss authorities extended the permissible limits of the margin of appreciation in violation of
Article 10 of the ECHR.
Three Fallacies
I cannot but agree with the Court on two central ﬁndings. First, drafting history is indeed an enterprise where
consensus is hardly possible. Therefore, it is worth transferring disputes about historical events from courts to
discussions amongst scholars and civil society. Second, it is hard to see how the issue of Armenian genocide
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addresses a suﬃcient social need for criminal prosecution in Switzerland. The outcome of the case is a plausible
victory for the freedom of academic expression.
However, I equally doubt if this social need for state monopoly over historic discussion is higher in other liberal
democracies. The Court creates a speculative distinction between the Holocaust and other 20th-century
atrocities. There are three fundamental fallacies in this approach, which undermine judgement and provoke the
stigmatization of Armenian communities worldwide.
1) The Court distinguishes Dr. Perinçek (who supposedly insists on an alternative qualiﬁcation of the events)
from Holocaust revisionists (who deny the substantial facts of the Shoah). It is hard to see how Perinçek could
have constructed his denial argument without re-qualifying the malicious intent of the state, the number of victims
(1-1.5 millions), the role of the Ottoman imperialism, and methods of annihilation used on the Armenian
population. Moreover, legal practice shows that discussion of history (the role of Atatürk, repressions against
Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians, etc.) remains substantially censored in Turkey. Attacks by the state and by
individuals on dissidents with alternative historical viewpoints remain common. The case of the Turkish-Armenian
journalist, Hrant Dink (who extensively commented on the Armenian genocide) is truly emblematic here.
Prosecuted for the absurd crime of denigrating Turkishness, he was assassinated in 2007. Three years later, the
ECtHR ruled that Turkey violated Dink’s right to freedom of expression.
In contrast, “Holocaust deniers” are not exclusively people who blatantly refute the existence of Jewish victims.
Holocaust revisionists include those who question the number of victims, the methods of annihilation, the role of
perpetrators, and those who suggest (despite all the abundant historical evidence) that Nazi governments did not
have intent of complete annihilation of the Jews. On a closer comparison, both issues (Auschwitzlüge and the
Armenian genocide) are a matter of qualiﬁcation.
2) The Court suggests that unlike the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust is an internationally recognised crime.
The Court forgets to mention that the Holocaust (unlike many other atrocities) ranks amongst the few endowed
with speciﬁc “legal” recognition. Judges Vučinić & Pinto De Albuquerque end their powerful dissenting opinion
by citing Raphael Lemkin, a lawyer who coined the term of genocide. It was, in fact, the Armenian tragedy that
initially inspired Lemkin’s ideas. He considered the League of Nation’s ignorance of Armenian massacre truly
shameful. The 1945 Nuremberg Statute (mentioned by the Court as clear grounds to prosecute Nazis) did not
precede the crime of the Holocaust. Likewise, Lemkin’s term “genocide” entered international vocabulary only by
virtue of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Apart from the Holocaust, neither the Roma genocide (approximately
300,000 people), nor persecution of gays, nor any other mass annihilation conducted by the Nazis received a
comparable legal acknowledgement. The Court ignores a simple fact that all genocides are a matter of contested
recognition.
3) This judgement constructs the Holocaust as a mega-genocide to which all else pales by comparison. The
Holocaust becomes a universal unit of measurement. It is unclear whether Armenian massacre stands as 0.5 or
0.8 of that unit. One can trace this meta-crime approach in the recent cases in Strasbourg. In Hoﬀer & Annen v.
Germany[UB3]  [2011], applicants were prosecuted for anti-abortion leaﬂets comparing the “Babycaust” to the
Holocaust. In PETA v. Germany  [UB4] [2012], the animals rights association was defending its artistic campaign
(“the Holocaust on your plate”), where pictures of animals in stocks were contrasted with images of inmates in
concentration camps. In both cases, the Court (rather erroneously) found no violation of freedom of expression,
fostering an incredibly broad margin of appreciation for Germany. It remains unclear how those two instances
reﬂect a deep social need. In Perinçek, the Court even says that the denial of the Armenian genocide is
incapable of producing eﬀects similar to the danger of Anti-Semitism. With this statement the Court ignores
extreme sensitivity to this issue on the part of both the Armenian communities in Diaspora (referring to the events
as Mets Yegherrn, literally “Great Crime”) and state propaganda in Turkey and Azerbaijan (after territorial conﬂict
with Armenia). Placing Armenian genocide into the second class of “contested massacres”, the Court overlooks
the suﬀerings of hundreds of thousands of Armenian people murdered and tortured in the “death march” to the
desert in Syria, deported, raped, poisoned and burned alive during and after World War I.
In this respect, the concurring opinion of Judges Raimondi & Sajó provides an extensive disclaimer for
Armenians (explaining the diﬃcult position of the Court). Yet the only true diﬃculty is the trap into which the Court
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had cornered itself in its previous Holocaust cases. While privileging the Shoah as a meta-crime, it is practically
impossible to justify the diﬀerence with comparable atrocities. Meanwhile, the Holocaust distinction gives the
Turkish government a green light for fostering xenophobic, Turkic-centric identity. It hardly makes reconciliation
of Armenians with Turks any easier. It diminishes and degrades historical accounts of Western Armenians
indispensable for the history of the Middle East and the Caucasus. Finally, it gives further impetus for the hysteria
about a Jewish conspiracy by Anti-Semites of all kinds.
The decision to move the qualiﬁcation of Armenian genocide away from state monopoly and leave it to historians
and civil society should be wholeheartedly welcome. However, the Court’s continuous misleading approach
(distinguishing the Holocaust from other fairly comparable atrocities) substantially undermines the judgement in
Perinçek. It essentially trivialises the suﬀerings of a million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and projects a
ﬂimsy judicial iconography with the Holocaust rising over other “second-class” evils.
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